



## Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [support@jstor.org](mailto:support@jstor.org).

V. — *On the Implicit Ethics and Psychology of Thucydides.*

By PAUL SHOREY,

PROFESSOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO.

THE main interest of the History of the Peloponnesian War does not lie in the incomparable vividness of the narrative, nor even in the tragic drama of the pride and fall of imperial Athens, and the pity of this suicide of the Hellenic race in its culminating age. Fascinating as is the mere story, its chief attraction for us consists in the fact that it is the embodiment of a subtle and consistent, if one-sided, philosophy of life; that it is, to adapt a phrase of Carlyle, a portion of human history penetrated and informed by the spirit of the man Thucydides. This Thucydidean criticism of life I propose to study in its two chief aspects, which for convenience I will designate as (1) ethical positivism, (2) intellectualism.

The fundamental assumption of this ethical positivism is that the nature and conduct of man are strictly determined by his physical and social environment and by a few elementary appetites and desires. Around this primitive core of human nature society and convention have wrapped sheath upon sheath of decorous pretence — ethical, social, religious. The naïve man is duped by this moral drapery, he accepts the word for the deed, the alleged motive for the true, and rarely, if ever, penetrates to the underlying realities. The wise man is not so deceived. He has looked into the workings of his own heart, he has studied human nature in the revealing light of war, pestilence, and revolution, and, however well draped the figures he meets in his daily walk, his penetrating imagination discovers the naked man beneath. Such is the conception of human life everywhere suggested

when not explicitly affirmed by Thucydides. The first axiom of this doctrine is that human nature remains always essentially the same, and that it cannot be permanently restrained or moulded by the artificial conventions of law and religion.<sup>1</sup>

It is on this belief that he bases his conception of history as philosophy teaching by example. He commends his work to the favorable judgment of those who desire to have an accurate knowledge of the past and so forecast the future which from the nature of man will resemble it.<sup>2</sup>

The atrocities of the revolutions of Corcyra are such as occur and always will recur while the nature of man remains unchanged. (III. 82.) The Athenians, so their envoys at Sparta declare, were constrained to accept and maintain their invidious empire by motives resistless to human nature, ambition, gain, and fear. It has always been the rule that those should take who have the power and those should keep who can, and no man possessing this power ever stayed his hand for abstract considerations of justice. This basic human nature the Athenians have indulged with great moderation.<sup>3</sup> I do not blame the aggression of the Athenians, says Hermocrates.<sup>4</sup> It is human nature everywhere to dominate those who submit. "We hold the customary beliefs about the gods" (the Athenians declare at Melos, V. 105), and we know for a certainty that men by an inevitable law of their nature dominate when they can. We did not promulgate

<sup>1</sup> The connection of cynicism and the doctrine of necessity in Thucydides is not accidental. In Machiavelli's first work on the revolt in the Val di Chiana, he appeals to Roman history for the solution of a problem in present politics: "... Perché gli uomini in sostanza sono sempre gli stessi ed hanno le medesime passione: così quando le circostanze sono identiche, le medesime cagione portano i medesimi effetti, e quindi gli stessi fatti debbono suggerire le stesse regole di condotta."

<sup>2</sup> I. 22. *κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπειον* by Thucydidean usage means more than "in all human probability," as Professor Jebb renders it, *Hellenica*, p. 266. Plato, *Crito* 46 E *ὅσα γὰρ τ' ἀνθρώπεια*, is not a parallel.

<sup>3</sup> I. 76 *χρησάμενοι τῇ ἀνθρωπείᾳ φύσει*. For the ethical suggestions of this phrase, cf. Aristoph. *Nubes* 1078 *χρῶ τῇ φύσει, σκίρτα, γέλα, νόμιζε μηδὲν αἰσχρόν*. Isoc. *Areopagit.* 38 *ὀκνοῦντας τῇ φύσει χρῆσθαι*.

<sup>4</sup> IV. 61.

this law, nor were we the first to profit by it. We found it in operation and shall leave it for all futurity.<sup>1</sup> It is in seasons of pestilence and revolution that all disguises are thrown off and this indomitable brutality of man is most plainly displayed. Neither fear of God nor law of man could check them, he says of the plague at Athens. Human nature prevailing over all laws is his summary of the conditions at Corcyra.<sup>2</sup>

The contempt of Thucydides' *alma sdegnosa* for this average elemental human nature is hinted in many a scornful phrase. Man is naturally fickle,<sup>3</sup> boastful,<sup>4</sup> envious,<sup>5</sup> ungrateful, and selfish,<sup>6</sup> elated by success, yet unable to bear prosperity.<sup>7</sup> The multitude are prone to magnify the unknown and remote,<sup>8</sup> intolerant of painstaking accuracy,<sup>9</sup> and easily seduced by false glitter.<sup>10</sup> Their judgments are swayed by mere words,<sup>11</sup> their beliefs determined by their desires,<sup>12</sup> and their moods shift with their changing conditions.<sup>13</sup>

But we look for something more philosophic than these

<sup>1</sup> This is generally rendered "We opine that the gods, and we know that men, rule when they can," etc. The sentence, if critically studied, is, as Dionysius says, *δυσέλκαστος καὶ τοῖς πάνι δοκοῦσιν ἐμπελῶς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἔχειν*, but in spite of the co-ordination with *τε*, I am inclined to take *ἡγούμεθα* in the first member absolutely: "We believe in the gods as a matter of opinion, and we know for a fact that men," etc. It is not in accordance with Thucydides' mental habit to argue that the gods rule when they have the power, and Dionysius in his close paraphrase ignores this thought. He says: *ὅτι τὸ μὲν θεῖον δόξη γιγνώσκουσιν ἅπαντες*.

<sup>2</sup> *τῶν νόμων κρατήσασα ἡ ἀνθρωπεία φύσις* III. 84. The phrase is in Thucydides' manner, even if the paragraph be spurious.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. II. 65 *ἅπερ φιλεῖ ὄμιλος ποιεῖν*, etc. Cf. IV. 28; VI. 63; VIII. 1.

<sup>4</sup> *τὸ ἀνθρώπειον κομπῶδες* V. 68.

<sup>5</sup> II. 35; II. 45; VI. 16 *τοῖς μὲν ἀστοῖς φθονεῖται φύσει*; II. 64 *ὅστις δ' ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπὶ φθονον λαμβάνει ὀρθῶς βουλευεται*.

<sup>6</sup> II. 40. 4; VI. 16 *ἀλλ' ὥσπερ δυστυχοῦντες οὐ παρασχομένους*; VIII. 89. 3.

<sup>7</sup> III. 39.

<sup>8</sup> VI. 11 *τὰ γὰρ διὰ πλείστου πάντες ἴσμεν θαυμάζόμενα*.

<sup>9</sup> I. 20; VI. 54 *ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν λέγοντας*, etc.

<sup>10</sup> I. 22; IV. 108. 4 *ἐφολλὰ*; V. 85 *ἐπαγωγὰ*; VI. 8. 2.

<sup>11</sup> VI. 34 *πρὸς τὰ λεγόμενα καὶ αἱ γινώμαι ἴστανται*.

<sup>12</sup> III. 3 *μεῖζον μέρος νέμοντες τῷ μὴ βούλεσθαι ἀληθῆ εἶναι*; IV. 108 *ὁ δὲ μὴ προσίενται λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι*.

<sup>13</sup> II. 54; I. 140. 1; III. 82. 2; cf. also IV. 61.

isolated disparaging utterances. We want a systematic ethical terminology based on a psychological analysis of the chief springs and motives of human action. The nearest approach to this is to be found in the speech of Diodotus on the affair of Mitylene, III. 45. "All men are naturally prone to error (he says in substance), and there is no law that will keep them from it. Legislators have run through the list of possible penalties to no effect, and we must invent some more awful terror than the fear of death if we expect to bridle human nature.<sup>1</sup> At one extreme of human condition poverty and necessity inspire reckless daring, at the other license begets grasping greed on insolence and pride; and so the various accidents and conditions of life acting with fatal necessity on the various tempers of men lure them on to danger.<sup>2</sup> And in addition to these impulses, hope and passionate desire are everywhere operative for harm, the one leading, the other following, the one devising enterprise, the other whispering promise of success,<sup>3</sup>—anticipations of the unseen future yet more potent over men's minds than dangers plainly seen.<sup>4</sup>

"Fortune, too, contributes her part to exalt men's spirits, and by the unexpectedness of her aid often induces them to venture with inferior resources—more especially states in so far as they contend for the highest stakes, freedom, or imperial dominion, and the individual acting with a multitude is more prone to an irrational overestimation of his powers. In short, it is impossible (and the supposition of the contrary is a mark of the utmost simplicity) to restrain by law or any other deterrent force any strong bent of

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bacon's saying: "There is no passion in the mind of man so weak but it mates and masters the fear of death."

<sup>2</sup> I cannot accept Classen's text nor his interpretation here. The scholiast rightly says: "ὁργή ὁ τρόπος." ὁργή though construed with ἐξάγουσι is felt with ξυντυχίαι. For the conjunction of ξυντυχίαι, γνώμη, and ὁργή, cf. III. 82. For the thought in ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσοτος, cf. Emerson's words: "... Temper prevails over everything of time, place, and condition, and is inconsumable in the flames of religion."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. IV. 65. 4; VI. 15. 1, 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. V. 87 ὦν ὁρᾶτε; V. 103 φανερά — ἀφανεῖς; V. 113; VI. 9. 3.

human nature."<sup>1</sup> If we add φιλοτιμία<sup>2</sup> and φιλονικία, pertinacity, or "persistiv constancy," to the positive promptings here enumerated, and supplement νόμος and φόβος by the restraining principles of αἰσχύνη and ἔλεος, we shall have a nearly complete list of Thucydidean motives. Every phrase in the speech of Diodotus is of typical significance for the whole history, and every term demands a commentary. This ἔρως retains nothing of the associations of that "thirst in all men's nature named ἔρως," which fills so large a place in Greek literature. It is simply the master passion, or the passion which for the moment has mastered the mind.

εὖ δ' ἴσθ', ὅτου τις τυγχάνει χρεῖαν ἔχων  
τοῦτ' ἔσθ' ἐκάστω μείζον ἢ Τροίαν ἐλεῖν,

says Menelaus in the Andromache. It is the ἔρως which the tyrant soul of the Republic (573 A) establishes on the throne as its bosom's lord; the desire of which Diotima says (Symp. 205 D), τὸ μὲν κεφάλαιόν ἐστι πᾶσα ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμία καὶ τοῦ εὐδαιμονεῖν ὁ μέγιστός τε καὶ δολερός ἔρως παντί. "Speaking broadly, all desire of good things and of happi-

<sup>1</sup> III. 45. 4 ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δὲ ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι, αἱ δὲ ἄλλαι ξυντυχίαι ὀργῇ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐκάστη τις κατέχεται ὑπ' ἀνηκέστου τινὸς κρείσσονος, ἐξάγουσιν ἐς τοὺς κινδύνους. ἢ τε ἐλπὶς καὶ ὁ ἔρως ἐπὶ παντί, ὁ μὲν ἡγούμενος, ἡ δὲ ἐφεπομένη, καὶ ὁ μὲν τὴν ἐπιβολὴν ἐκφροντίζων, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐπορίαν τῆς τύχης ὑποτιθεῖσα πλεῖστα βλάπτουσι, καὶ ὄντα ἀφανῆ κρείσσω ἐστὶ τῶν ὀρωμένων δεινῶν. καὶ ἡ τύχη ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲν ἔλασσον ζυμβάλλεται ἐς τὸ ἐπαίρειν· ἀδοκῆτως γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε παρισταμένη καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑποδεεστέρων κινδυνεύειν τινὰ προάγει καὶ οὐχ ἥσσαν τὰς πόλεις, ὅσῳ περὶ τῶν μεγίστων, ἔλευθερίας ἢ ἄλλων ἀρχῆς, καὶ μετὰ πάντων ἕκαστος ἀλογίστως ἐπὶ πλεόν τι αὐτὸν ἐδόξασεν. ἀπλῶς τε ἀδύνατον καὶ πολλῆς εὐθείας, ὅστις οἴεται τῆς ἀνθρωπείας φύσεως ὀρμωμένης προθύμως τι πράξαι ἀποτροπὴν τινα ἔχειν ἢ νόμων ἰσχύϊ ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ δεινῷ. With this *résumé* of Thucydidean psychology it is interesting to compare the poetic description in the Timæus of the mortal soul, "subject to terrible and irresistible (ἀναγκαῖα) affections, — first of all pleasure, the greatest incitement to evil, then pain, which deters from good, — confidence and fear, two foolish counsellors, anger hard to be appeased and *hope* easily led astray. These they mingled with irrational sense and *love* (passionate desire) that attempteth all things, according to necessary laws, and so framed man." (69 C D, Jowett.)

<sup>2</sup> III. 82. 8. τὸ φιλότιμον ἀγήρων μόνον II. 44. 4.

ness is the chiefest and cunning lure of love to every man." Like the Heracleitean *θυμός*, it buys its will at the price of death. It is *ἐπιχειρητὴς ἅπαντος* in Plato's phrase, — *ἐκφροντίζων τὴν ἐπιβολήν*, as Thucydides puts it. Thucydides usually employs the weaker synonym *ὄρμη*, reserving the tragic intensity of *ἔρως* for the fatal passion of Athens for the expedition against Sicily.<sup>1</sup> But whether exalted and animated by desire<sup>2</sup> or goaded by necessity and intolerable humiliation,<sup>3</sup> men's acts are too rarely determined by a cool, logical calculation of the chances of success. Their judgments are affected by their tempers.<sup>4</sup> *τόλμα* is frequently *ἀλόγιστος* (III. 82; VI. 59). For when *ὄρμη* hath fallen upon or *ἔρως* taken possession of the soul, *ἐλπίς* enters in to heighten confidence and blind to the risk of failure.

The Greeks seem to have been particularly exposed to the temptations of the over-sanguine temperament, and their moralists are inexhaustible in warnings against its illusions. "From Zeus there cometh no clear sign to men: yet, nevertheless, we enter on high counsels and meditate many acts; for by shameless hope our bodies are enthralled, but the tides of our affairs are hidden from our fore-knowledge," says Pindar (Nem. XI. in fin., Myers). "For that hope whose wanderings are so wide is to many men a comfort, but to many a false lure of giddy desire," sing the chorus of the *Antigone* (615 Jebb). And similar is the lesson which the speakers in Thucydides constantly inculcate in a more bitter and cynical tone. "Intelligence," says Pericles, "relies not so much on hope, which is strongest when all else fails, as on estimates based on existing resources by judgment, whose

<sup>1</sup> Cf. IV. 4 *τοῖς στρατιώταις* . . . *ὄρμη ἐπέπεσε*; VI. 24 *καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι*; VI. 13 *μηδ' . . . δυσέρωτας εἶναι τῶν ἀπόντων*.

<sup>2</sup> *ἐπαίρεσθαι κέρδει* III. 38; *ἐλπιδι* III. 45; *ξυνέσεως ἀγῶνι* III. 37; *τῇ νίκῃ* VII. 41; *ἡδονῇ* I. 84; *εὐτυχίᾳ* I. 120, etc.

<sup>3</sup> *παροξύνειν, παροξύνεσθαι* I. 67, I. 84, VI. 88, V. 99; *τῷ ἀναγκαίῳ* VI. 56.

<sup>4</sup> VIII. 2. 2 *ὀργῶντες κρίνουν τὰ πράγματα*; II. 21' *ὧν ἀκροᾶσθαι ὡς ἕκαστος ὥρμητο*; IV. 108 *βουλήσκει κρίνοντες ἀσαφεῖ ἢ προνοίᾳ ἀσφαλεῖ*; I. 122 *εὐοργήτως*. Cf. also VI. 13 *ἐπιθυμία μὲν ἐλάχιστα κατορθοῦνται, προνοίᾳ δὲ πλείεστα*; II. 11 *καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλείεστα ἐς ἔργον καθίστανται*; II. 22 *ὀργῇ . . . γνώμῃ*.

forecasts are surer.”<sup>1</sup> The feeble who put their trust in the spendthrift hope (the Athenians warn the Melians) discover her perfidy only when she has left them nothing for their dear-bought knowledge to guard.<sup>2</sup> This disparagement of hope is frequently accompanied by an allusion to the proverbial uncertainty of the future,<sup>3</sup> — the surprises of war,<sup>4</sup> the paradoxes of fortune.<sup>5</sup>

“You Athenians (say the Spartan envoys, IV. 17) will not abuse your success at Sphacteria like fools unaccustomed to the vicissitudes of fortune, who ever reach out in hope of more because their present good luck has come as a surprise.” Similarly, Hermocrates, urging on the Sicilian States peace and union in the face of Athenian aggression (IV. 62), warns those who expect to profit by a prolongation of their dissensions: And if any one bases expectations of advantage on the justice of his cause or his superior might, let him not expose himself to reverses that will grievously disappoint his hope . . . for righteous Vengeance does not necessarily prosper because deserved, nor is strength secure because it is full of hope.<sup>6</sup>

“When rational grounds of hope fail, men resort to the unseen, to oracles and prophecies,” Thucydides says with cold contempt, or its place is taken by stubborn persistency in a course once determined upon. This pertinacity is characteristic of the eager Athenian temperament. As emulous

<sup>1</sup> II. 62. I do not accept Classen's suggestion that *τόλμα* is the subject here. For the antithesis of *ἐλπίς* and *ὑπάρχοντα* cf. VI. 31. 6 *ἐπὶ μεγίστῃ ἐλπίδι τῶν μελλόντων πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα ἐπεχειρήθη*, and also V. 111 *ἐλπιδόμενα . . . ὑπάρχοντα*; VI. 9. 3.

<sup>2</sup> V. 103.

<sup>3</sup> I. 42. 2; III. 42; IV. 62. 4; V. 113; VI. 9.

<sup>4</sup> III. 30. 4; I. 122 *ἥκιστα ὁ πόλεμος ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς χωρεῖ*; II. 11; VII. 61; I. 78; V. 102.

<sup>5</sup> VIII. 24 *ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις*, etc.; I. 140. 1, 2.

<sup>6</sup> Jowett's “let him not take his disappointment (sc. at the frustration of his hope by my words) to heart” is doubtful. *τῷ παρ' ἐλπίδα σφάλλασθαι*, cf. VII. 66, seems to refer to an actual reversal of expectation by the event. The sentence is a curiously worded threatening admonition characteristic of Hermocrates. Cf. VI. 78: “And if he prove to have erred in judgment, he may live to bewail his own misfortunes and wish to be envying my prosperity again.”



thirst for fresh glory,<sup>1</sup> it built up and maintained their empire.<sup>2</sup> As "persistent constancy" it appears in the bull-dog tenacity with which they held on to Aegina in the face of an overwhelming combination of enemies (I. 105) and in the proud boast, "The Athenians never yet withdrew from any siege from fear of any."<sup>3</sup> As blind, presumptuous folly<sup>4</sup> it wrought their final ruin at Syracuse.<sup>5</sup>

We have already noted the impotence of the fear of God or the law of man to control these active promptings of human nature, and we shall find generally a touch of irony in Thucydides' allusions to the checking and restraining principles. "Pity should be reserved for equals," says Cleon in his speech on Mitylene,<sup>6</sup> and sweet reasonableness or indulgence (*ἐπιεικεία*) should be shown to those who are likely to prove conformable<sup>7</sup> in the sequel. They are dangerous feelings for an imperial city to entertain towards inferiors. And his opponent, too, is careful to insist that he would not have the decision of the Athenians influenced in the least by pity or equity. "Do not let the Plataeans melt your hearts, O men of Sparta," the Thebans cry, "by appealing to good deeds that are ancient history now. Degenerate virtue can claim no remuneration for the thing it was." (III. 67.) And the Athenians peremptorily bid the Melians base their arguments solely on the real purposes and power of the contestants, and not on any unreal moral conventions. Even where Thucydides' ethical language is not distinctly cynical, it is singularly lacking in warmth and depth of feeling. He frequently indulges in sneers at the illusions of

<sup>1</sup> φιλονικία περί τοῦ πλέονος ἤδη καλοῦ.

<sup>2</sup> I. 70 ἦν ἄρα τοῦ καὶ πείρα σφαλῶσιν ἀντελπίσαντες ἄλλα ἐπλήρωσαν τὴν χρείαν. Cf. IV. 55. 3.

<sup>3</sup> V. 111; cf. II. 64 διὰ τὸ ταῖς ξυμφοραῖς μὴ εἰκεῖν, and III. 16.

<sup>4</sup> μωρία φιλονικῶν IV. 64; cf. τῶν πάντων ἀπερίοπτοι παρὰ τὸ νικᾶν I. 41.

<sup>5</sup> VII. 28.

<sup>6</sup> III. 40. Jowett's "Mercy should be reserved for the merciful" is a misconception. Vide si tanti Classen's note. For the idea that justice obtains only between equals, cf. III. 9; V. 89.

<sup>7</sup> This is the best single word to convey the associations of ἐπιτήδειος here. Cf. ἐπιτηδείως I. 19, I. 144, and ἐπιτηδεῖα V. 82.

poetry, patriotism, and the mythical fancy.<sup>1</sup> He habitually speaks of virtue in a hard, external way as something to be acquired, professed, husbanded, exchanged, I had almost said bought and sold.<sup>2</sup>

A similar moral insensibility is to be noted in his employment of the words *θεραπεύειν*, *εὐπρεπές*, *δίκαιον*, *ἀνδραγαθία*, etc., etc.<sup>3</sup>

A good illustration of Thucydides' tone in these matters is his treatment of the specially Greek notion of *αἰδώς*, that delicate sensitiveness to the disapprobation of our fellows that sometimes approaches very nearly to the modern idea of self-respect.<sup>4</sup> It is, perhaps, hardly an accident that Thucydides, except in one passage (I. 84. 3), everywhere substitutes the coarser term *αἰσχύνη* or *τὸ αἰσχρόν* for the more distinctly ethical *αἰδώς*. The implication is that *αἰδώς* is a rational motive only when it takes the form of intolerable constraining shame. At the time of the plague (II. 51) those suffered most who had a reputation for virtue to keep up; for from very shame they were unsparing of themselves. That is the tone. One should deal with a powerful enemy in a spirit of sweet reasonableness and virtue (say the Spartan envoys, IV. 19), for he will be more likely to keep faith from very shame. But this sense of shame is mere folly when cherished as a Quixotic sense of honor by the weak. "What is that word honor? Air. A trim reckoning," the Athenians declare in substance at Melos. And on those who pertinaciously follow its lure it brings

<sup>1</sup> II. 41. 4; V. 41. 2 *ἐδόκει μωρία εἶναι ταῦτα*, of the combat for Thyrea in Hdt. I. 82; VI. 83 *οὐ καλλιπεύμεθα*; I. 21 *τὸ μὴ μωθῶδες . . . ἀτερπέστερον*; I. 10. 3, 4.

<sup>2</sup> I. 123 *τὰς ἀρετὰς κτᾶσθαι*; II. 51 *οἱ ἀρετῆς τι ἀντιποιούμενοι*; I. 33 *φέρουσα ἐς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀρετὴν*; VI. 11 *δόξαν ἀρετῆς μελετῶσιν*; VI. 54 *ἐπετήθδουσιν ἀρετὴν καὶ ζῦναι*; II. 40 *τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀποδώσων*; IV. 19 *ἀνταποδοῦναι ἀρετὴν*.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. VI. 79 *δειλία . . . τὸ δίκαιον . . . θεραπεύετε*; III. 56 *τὸ . . . ξυμφέρον . . . θεραπεύοντες*; I. 39 *τὸ εὐπρεπὲς τῆς δίκης*; III. 64 *ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων κακῷ ἀνδραγαθίαν προὔθεσθε*; II. 63 *ἀπραγμοσύνη ἀνδραγαθίζεται*; III. 40 *ἐκ τοῦ ἀκινδύνου ἀνδραγαθίζεσθαι*. Cf. also the use of *ἀνεπίφθορον* to debase the moral currency in I. 75, I. 82, VI. 83, VIII. 50, and the similar employment of *ἐυγνώμη* I. 32. 5, III. 40, IV. 61. 5, VIII. 50. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Gildersleeve on *αἰδεσθέντες ἀλκάν* Pindar. Pyth. IV. 173.

the greater dishonor of impracticable folly (V. 111). In short, a nice sense of honor is simply one of the many perturbing emotional forces that are the cause that men so rarely bring an unimpassioned judgment to bear on the complicated game of life.<sup>1</sup>

This brings us to what may be called the intellectualism of Thucydides,—his constant preoccupation with the part played in human life by the conscious calculating reason.<sup>2</sup> “The moral and the intellectual,” says Professor Jowett, “are always dividing, yet they must be reunited and in the highest conception of them are inseparable.” In Homer we are happily unconscious of this opposition,—the true man is ἀγαθὸς καὶ ἐχέφρων, and to “know lawless things” is to do them even as to know good things is to be just according to the reasoning of the Socrates of the Gorgias. In Thucydides we are never allowed to forget the antithesis. Plato endeavors to reunite the severed halves of our nature; and Aristotle by his formal distinction between the ethical and the intellectual virtues recognizes from the point of view of common sense the impracticability of the Platonic ideal. “We must not permit the wicked to give the name smartness to their unscrupulousness,” says Plato (Theaetet. 176 D), “for they glory in the reproach.” “Most men,” says Thucydides (III. 82), “more easily submit to be called clever knaves than honest simpletons;<sup>3</sup> they glory in the one epithet and blush at the other.”

There is a seeming injustice in attributing to Thucydides this feeling of “the many.” But his protest is couched in language half contemptuous: “Simple-mindedness, a chief element of nobility, was quite laughed down.” And the entire history is pervaded by a most un-Platonic antithesis between the just and the profitable; a most un-Platonic association of σωφροσύνη and ἀμαθία, and a constant exalta-

<sup>1</sup> Cf. supra, p. 6; VIII. 27.

<sup>2</sup> Chez Thucydide partout où les idées paraissent elles priment les sentiments. — Girard.

<sup>3</sup> ῥᾶον κέκληνται does not mean “are oftener called,” as it has been taken. It must be construed by the analogy of ῥᾶον φέρει VIII. 89.

tion of unscrupulous intellect.<sup>1</sup> The nomenclature of this intellectual principle is noteworthy. Thucydides does not use σοφός with its earlier suggestion of skill and its later connotation of the higher wisdom. He does not employ the φρόνησις and φρονεῖν of Plato and the dramatists with their moral and religious coloring, nor νοῦς with its speculative associations. His words are: γνώμη, mind, judgment; ξύνεσις, understanding, the intelligence that penetrates shams; λογισμός and its paronyms, the calculating reason.<sup>2</sup>

His most characteristic laudatory epithet, applied to Archidamus, Themistocles, Theseus, Pericles, Hermocrates, and Phrynichus, is οὐκ ἀξύνετος, not unintelligent, they could see through a mill-stone. When σώφρων is added, it denotes judgment, moderation, discretion, prudence unclouded by passion, rather than any distinctively moral excellence.<sup>3</sup> And the most unpardonable insult, the most stinging imputation, to a Thucydidean personage is the suggestion that he is deficient in penetration or dull in perceptions.<sup>4</sup> "Do not suppose that we would insult your intelligence by attempting to instruct you," say the Spartan envoys at Athens (IV. 17), "our words are only a reminder." The

<sup>1</sup> E.g. I. 42; V. 89; I. 68; III. 37; III. 56; III. 44. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. II. 11. 7; 40. 3; IV. 10; IV. 108. 4, etc. For ἐκλογίζεσθαι cf. II. 40. 3; IV. 10, etc. I will not, with Professor Jebb (*Hellenica*, p. 302), add διάνοια; for διάνοια in Thucydides means usually "purpose," or mind and temper generally. It rarely is used to denote the intellectual power in especial as in III. 82. 3 τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας. Neglect of this nicety has, I think, led Professor Jebb into error in his interpretation of VI. 11. 6 χρῆ δὲ μὴ πρὸς τὰς τύχας τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπαίρεσθαι ἀλλὰ τὰς διανοίας κρατήσαντας θαρσεῖν, which he cites together with I. 84. 3 in support of the sentence: "In a trial of human forces the chances baffle prediction, but superiority in ideas (διάνοιαι) is a sure ground of confidence." But the words really mean: We should feel confident only when we have subjugated the minds (broken the spirit) of our opponents, — i.e. made them feel that they are beaten. The context and the use of the aorist are sufficient confirmation of this reading; but if more is wanted, cf. II. 87 οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δὲ τινα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀντιλογίαν, τῆς γε ξυμφορᾶς τῷ ἀποβάντι ἀμβλύνεσθαι. Cf. VI. 72.

<sup>3</sup> I. 80. 2. Cf. I. 84. 2, I. 80, V. 101. Cf. σωφροσύνη . . . ἀβουλία I. 32; VI. 6. 2; VIII. 24. 5 ἐσωφρόνησαν . . . παρὰ τὸ ἀσφαλέστερον πράξαι.

<sup>4</sup> ἀναίσθητος VI. 86; I. 69; I. 82.

frequency of similar oratorical precautions<sup>1</sup> and phrases like *ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα* and *τῆς ξυνέσεως μεταποιεῖσθαι* (I. 140) testify to the intensity of this feeling. A Corcyrean audience, like an audience of the Italian renaissance, would certainly have sympathized less with the *ἀναίσθητος* Othello than with the *ξυνετός* Iago, *ὅτι ἀπάτη περιγινόμενος ξυνέσεως ἀγώνισμα παρελάμβανε* (III. 82).<sup>2</sup> "We Athenians," Pericles boasts (II. 40), "can all either originate or at least judge political measures." "What each of you most desires," says Cleon (III. 38), here, as often, showing us the seamy side of the Periclean ideal, "is to be able to speak himself, or, failing that, to vie in cleverness with the speakers in the readiness with which you apprehend, or anticipate, and applaud their points, however slow you may be in foreseeing practical consequences." It is only those who have a saving distrust of their own intelligence,<sup>3</sup> like the slow-witted Spartans, who will admit that they are *ἀμαθέστεροι τῶν νόμων*.<sup>4</sup>

The empire of what our ignorance calls chance<sup>5</sup> reduces this power of the intellect to a comparatively humble rôle.<sup>6</sup>

The course of human events, especially in war, is full of baffling surprises. The wise man is at the best like

<sup>1</sup> Cf. IV. 126; V. 9; V. 69 in fin. Cf. also IV. 10 *μηδεὶς . . . ξυνετὸς βουλέσθω δοκεῖν εἶναι ἐκλογιζόμενος*.

<sup>2</sup> But cf. the manlier language of Brasidas, IV. 86. 6.

<sup>3</sup> *ἀπιστοῦντες τῇ ἐξ αὐτῶν ξυνέσει* III. 37.

<sup>4</sup> III. 37; I. 84. 3.

<sup>5</sup> *διόπερ καὶ τὴν τύχην ὅσα ἂν παρὰ λόγον ξυμβῇ εἰώθαμεν αἰτιάσθαι* I. 140. Cf. Anaxagoras apud Diels *Doxographi* 326 a (*τὴν τύχην*) *ἄδηλον αἰτίαν ἀνθρώπινῳ λογισμῷ*. This more nearly represents Thucydides' feeling than Professor Jebb's "inscrutable dispensation of a divine Providence." The phrase *τύχη ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ* (V. 104, 112) is not used absolutely, but with a verb, *ἐλασώσασθαι, σωζούσῃ*, with which the *ἐκ* is connected at least as closely as it is with the noun. It is not *τύχη* in general, but the special favor of heaven, the last straw at which the despairing Melians vainly clutch. Similarly, "they are matters not for reasoning, but for resignation" is too unctuous for the cold severity of *φέρειν τε χρὴ τὰ τε δαιμόνια ἀναγκαίως* of II. 64. It is rather *θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φιλὸν δαμάσαντες ἀνάγκη*—let determined things to destiny hold unbewailed their way. For additional copious but indiscriminating references on *τύχη*, cf. Classen, *Einl.* LVIII.

<sup>6</sup> IV. 62. 4; I. 84.

Themistocles, τῶν μελλόντων . . . ἄριστος εἰκαστής. The lamp of his intelligence illumines but dimly a few steps in front of his feet, but only a fool (ἄξύνετος) or a charlatan (III. 42) will affirm that he knows of any other light cast upon the unseen future save that thrown upon it by reason and rational discussion (λόγος). The sensible man will not wish to resemble the herd who when expectations based on visible tangible realities fail them turn in their extremity to the invisible, to prophecies and oracles, and other delusions that lure men with hopes to their ruin, neglecting the human instrumentalities that might still save them from the worst.<sup>1</sup> He knows that he cannot control fortune as he can his own resolutions, and so is prepared to make reasonable concessions in the hour of success.<sup>2</sup> He knows that the malignity of chance and the illogical logic of events may defeat the best laid plans,<sup>3</sup> and that no human achievement is secure against change and decay.<sup>4</sup> And so he accepts the strokes of human adversaries with courage and those of the higher powers with submission to the inevitable.<sup>5</sup> Still more baffling to the wise man's sagacity is the dissimulation of his fellows. The naïve man believes what he is told and suspects nothing. On emerging from this naïveté he passes to the opposite extreme (Plato, *Phaedo*, 89 D E). He looks always for the *dessous des cartes*, and the antithesis of the real and the apparent becomes the chief category of his thought. This is the attitude of the personages of Thucydides, who are never weary of distinguishing the word

<sup>1</sup> V. 103. Professor Jebb's paraphrase misrepresents the feeling of this passage: "This, however, he would affirm—that such resources are not to be tried until all resources within human control have been tried in vain." This is a distinctive Socratic or Platonic thought—I do not believe that it can be found in Thucydides. I do not wish to seem to split hairs, but shades of meaning are as worthy of observation as niceties of syntax, and it is as important that our quotations should be strictly relevant as it is that our accents should be correct.

<sup>2</sup> IV. 64; I. 120. 3, 4, 5.

<sup>3</sup> I. 140 ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τὰς ξυμφορὰς τῶν πραγμάτων οὐχ ἥσσον ἀμαθῶς χωρῆσαι ἢ καὶ τὰς διανοίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. VIII. 24.

<sup>4</sup> II. 64.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* and II. 44. 1.

from the deed,<sup>1</sup> the pretext from the motive,<sup>2</sup> the specious or plausible from the actual or true.<sup>3</sup> Readiness to conceive suspicions and quickness to anticipate an injury are throughout regarded as marks of a superior intelligence.<sup>4</sup> But as Plato says, the cleverness of the over-suspicious man is really a low superficial cunning. He quite loses his bearings in the society of large, true natures. The really difficult thing is to discriminate, to know when to trust and when to distrust. For unreasonable suspicion is as stupid as naïve credulity.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, as Thucydides observes, universal distrust overreaches itself. The unhappy Greeks of this age had become so perfect in this fatal logic of suspicion that they could find a flaw in any argument that promised assurance of security in another's pledges, and so being unable to confide were compelled to forestall.<sup>6</sup>

In these contests brutal dullards who from self-distrust struck at once, got the better of the finer wits who, relying on the ingenuity of their combinations, contemptuously bided their time.<sup>7</sup> This self-defeat of the power of the

<sup>1</sup> *Passim*.

<sup>2</sup> I. 23 τὴν ἀληθεστάτην πρόφασιν ἀφανεστάτην δὲ λόγῳ; III. 86 προφάσει . . . βουλόμενοι; VI. 6. 1; VI. 33 πρόφασιν . . . τὸ δὲ ἀληθές; VI. 76 προφάσει—διανοίῃ.

<sup>3</sup> E.g. πρόσχημα I. 96; III. 82. 4; V. 30. 2; I. 37. 4 τὸ εὐπρεπὲς ἀσπονδον . . . προβέβληνται; VIII. 66 ἦν τοῦτο εὐπρεπὲς πρὸς τοὺς πλείους; I. 39. 2; III. 38. 2, etc. Cf. in Tacitus the use of obtentui; sub obtentu; praetendere; obtegere; ut ea specie; specie honoris; speciosa verbis; re inania aut subdola, and similar expressions.

<sup>4</sup> III. 82. 5 καὶ ὑπονοήσας ἔτι δεινότερος; cf. III. 43. 3.

<sup>5</sup> Republic, 409 B C D.

<sup>6</sup> III. 83. The sentence here paraphrased has been strangely misunderstood by Classen and others through failure to appreciate the Greek point of view. An argument or a speech is a combat of wit in which he who fails to convince is worsted. Cf. III. 37 τῶν τε ἀεὶ λεγομένων ἐς τὸ κοινὸν περιγίγνεσθαι; III. 42 ὁ μὴ πείσας ἀξυνετώτερος ἂν δόξας εἶναι, etc.; Plato Phaedr. 272 B ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος κρατεῖ. He who says, "I don't believe you," has the better of him (Jowett). Now everybody at Corcyra was superior in his reasoning to any considerations that held out hope of security; which in Thucydides' implicit manner becomes "was superior in argument for (to, towards) the hopelessness of security." Cf. further IV. 108 λογισμῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι; III. 11 τὸ δὲ ἀντίπαλον δέος μόνον πιστόν, etc. Cf. the complaint of Diodotus, III. 43. 3, of Athenian suspicion.

<sup>7</sup> III. 83. 3; III. 37. 4. Cf. La Rochefoucauld, maxim 129.

intellect suggests its abdication, and so, as an alternative to the dominant Ionian ideal, Thucydides depicts for us that of Sparta,—self-restraint in place of expansion, discipline and caution rather than the free play of the intelligence: “We are not cunning in useless matters. We think the wits of our neighbors as keen as our own. We do not expect by ratiocination to forecast the caprices of fortune. We do not base our hopes on the blunders of our opponents. We hold that man does not differ much from man, and that he is best who is trained in the severest school.”<sup>1</sup> This is the Spartan theory of practice. Thucydides pronounces no judgment. Truly, as Pindar says: *τοῦτο δ' ἀμάχανον εὐρεῖν ὃ τι νῦν ἐν καὶ τελευτᾷ φέρεται ἀνδρὶ τυχεῖν*. But the imperishable interest of the history lies chiefly in its incomparably vivid presentation of the struggle between these two conflicting ideals of human life.<sup>2</sup>

To this prevailing intellectualism it would be possible by the exercise of a little ingenuity to trace the special minor characteristics of Thucydidean style and idiom, carefully noted by critics and editors from Dionysius to Classen and Jebb. E.g. the archaic poetical diction, the bold metaphor,<sup>3</sup> the abuse of antithesis,<sup>4</sup> otiose periphrases,<sup>5</sup> and pointed pedantic discrimination of synonyms<sup>6</sup> the loose

<sup>1</sup> I. 84 freely paraphrased; cf. III. 37, 38.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. I. 70; I. 84; II. 39, 40, 46.

<sup>3</sup> To few examples in Blass Att. Bered. 1<sup>2</sup>, p. 211, add ὑπουργοῦν αὐτονομίαν VIII. 64; φυγὰς τε γὰρ εἰμι τῆς τῶν ἐξελασάντων πονηρίας VI. 92; προσείοντες φόβον VI. 86; II. 53 τὴν ἡδὴ κατεψηφισμένην σφῶν ἐπικρεμασθήναι. Cf. III. 40 and I. 18. VI. 18 τὴν πόλιν . . . τρίψεσθαι τε αὐτὴν περὶ αὐτὴν ὥσπερ καὶ ἄλλο τι; VI. 36. 2 ὅπως τῷ κοινῷ φόβῳ τὸν σφέτερον ἐπηλυγάζωνται; VI. 41 οἷς ὁ πόλεμος ἀγάλλεται; VI. 18. 3 καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡμῖν ταμיעῦσθαι ἐς ὅσον βουλόμεθα ἀρχειν.

<sup>4</sup> λόγῳ—ἔργῳ; οἰκείος—ἀλλότριος II. 39; III. 13. 5; I. 78; IV. 98. 3; I. 70. 6; ἴδιον—κοινόν III. 14; II. 43. 2; δοκοῦσα . . . φαινόμενη I. 32; μακρὰν—ἐγγύθεν III. 13; III. 64. 5; IV. 36. 2; IV. 61. 3, 8; VI. 76. 2, 3; III. 38. 4.

<sup>5</sup> Dionysius De Thucyd. 29, 32. Cf. the mannerism of τὰ παρ' ὑμῶν I. 69; τὰ τῶν πόλεων III. 82; τὰ τῆς ὀργῆς II. 60; τὰ τοῦ πολέμου V. 86; τὰ τῆς τύχης IV. 55; τὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ καταστρώματος VII. 70.

<sup>6</sup> I. 69. 6; I. 122. 4; II. 62. 3; III. 39. 2; III. 82. 4; VI. 76. 3; Blass I. 219. Dionysius De Thucyd. Judic. 46 ἢ τε τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξήγησις ἀμφοτέρων σοφιστικὴ καὶ ἀπειρόκαλος.



anacoluthic structure conforming rather to the implicit logic of association than to the explicit logic of formal grammar;<sup>1</sup> the *ποικιλία* or wanton variation of the syntax of functionally parallel clauses and adverbial phrases;<sup>2</sup> the fondness for litotes and suggestive pregnant uses especially of the adverb,<sup>3</sup> the passionate desire, as it has been put, to compress a book into a chapter, a chapter into a paragraph, and a paragraph into a sentence.<sup>4</sup> Also the deliberate preference for the abstract generalizing vague expression over the concrete definite, and the forcing of Greek idiom in this direction, as illustrated by the quasi-philosophical use of *ἰδέα*,<sup>5</sup> by the substitution of abstract nouns or neuter adjectives and participles for verbal forms of expression,<sup>6</sup> by the generalizing use of the neuter participle or adjective,<sup>7</sup> and the

<sup>1</sup> See the list in Boehme's index, s.v. Anakoluth, Accommodation, Ergänzung, Subjekt, Uebergang, Verschmelzung, Wechsel, etc. Note especially the use of *τοῦτο δρᾶν* I. 5. 2; II. 49. 5; IV. 19. 4; *αὐτὸ δρᾶν* = *πολεμεῖν* IV. 59. 2; I. 31. 2; III. 10. 6; V. 49. 4; VI. 83. 1 = *ναυτικὸν κτλ. παρεχόμενοι*.

<sup>2</sup> Blass I. p. 215; I. 2; I. 9. 1; I. 49. 3; I. 82. 1 *μήτε πόλεμον ἄγαν δηλοῦντας μήθ' ὥς ἐπιτρέψομεν*; II. 27. 2 *κατὰ τε τὸ . . . διάφορον καὶ ὅτι*; V. 9. 4, 6; VII. 82. 2; VII. 57. 1.

<sup>3</sup> As Shaks. Cor. I. 1, what he hath done *famously*. Cf. IV. 100. 4 *λοῦσα στεγανῶς*, "through a covered passage"; I. 92 *ἀνεπικλήτως*; II. 64. 2 *ἀναγκαίως*, "with close-lipped patience for our only friend"; II. 65. 8 *ἐλευθέρως*; III. 40. 1 *ἀνθρωπίνως*; III. 40. 4 *ξυμφόρως*; III. 56. 7 *κερδαλέως*; IV. 18. 4; *οὔτινες τάγαθὰ ἐς ἀμφίβολον ἀσφαλῶς ἔθεντο*; IV. 62. 3, 4 *χαλεπῶς, δικάως*; VI. 11. 3 *ἐκείνως*; cf. I. 77 and III. 46; V. 91 *χρησίμως*; VI. 87. 5 *ἀπραγμόνως*. The grammatical indexes ignore this usage, and give only commonplace instances of *ἐς* with implied motion. Thucydides' use of litotes hardly needs illustration. Cf. *οὐχ ἦσσαν, οὐχ ἦκιστα, οὐκ ἐλάσσους, οὐκ ἀξύνετος, οὐδὲ ἀδύνατος*.

<sup>4</sup> *τὸ περᾶσθαι δι' ἐλαχίστων ὀνομάτων πλείστα σημαίνειν πράγματα* Dionysius De iis quae Thucyd. 2.

<sup>5</sup> E.g. *τῇ αὐτῇ ἰδέᾳ ἐκεῖνά τε ἔσχον καὶ τὰ ἐνθάδε νῦν πευρῶνται* VI. 76. 3. Cf. III. 62. 2; and *εἶδος* in VI. 77. 2, etc.

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Blass I. p. 213, Dionysius De iis quae Thucyd. propria sunt V., Classen Einleitung LXXX. A good example is II. 64 *ὅστις δ' ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει*, where besides the avoidance of the passive form we gain the thought that it is in any case impossible to escape envy, and therefore the sage will choose to be envied for something worth having. Cf. supra, p. 3; cf. also *τὴν οὐκ ἐτι ἐπαναγωγὴν* VII. 34 and similar expressions III. 95, V. 35, and V. 50.

<sup>7</sup> Blass I. p. 214, Classen Einl. LXXX. The neuter undoubtedly does, as Classen says, give a body to the abstraction, but the natural Greek would in the majority of instances have avoided the abstract form altogether.

use of a generalizing personal relative clause in loose appositional exegesis of a preceding generalization, expressed or implied.<sup>1</sup>

It would, I say, be a very interesting but somewhat fanciful undertaking to trace these minor traits of style to their source in the dominant qualities of Thucydides' mind. If we followed the lead of Dionysius, we should account for most of them by the writer's conscious desire to display his own ingenuity and startle and subjugate his reader's intelligence.<sup>2</sup> The more approved modern view is that in Jebb's words, "we see a vigorous mind in the very act of struggling to mould a language of magnificent but immature capabilities." To this view we all except Mr. Mahaffy incline. But I think few of us can read Dionysius' analysis of the Corcyra passage or of the Melian dialogue without being shaken in our faith. *περιπέφρασται πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀναγκαῖον* is his illuminating condemnatory phrase. Do the periphrases and the contortions of structure and the affected nicety in the employment of synonyms add anything to the real weight of the thought? Do they result from the struggle of a powerful intelligence with an unformed idiom, or are they added, for general literary gorgeousness (as Mark Twain would say), by a conscious and perverse art? There is enough truth certainly in the disparaging view to make all who have struggled with Thucydides enjoy Dionysius' amusing account of how "he spent the whole twenty-seven years of the war in 'upsetting' the style of those eight books and filing and polishing each one of his parts of speech; now expanding a word into a phrase, and now condensing a phrase to a word, and at one time expressing a verbal idea by a substantive, and again turning

<sup>1</sup> II. 44. 1 τὸ δ' εὐτυχές, οἱ ἄν, etc.; II. 62. 4 καταφρόνησις δὲ ὅς ἄν; VI. 14 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἄρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι ὅς ἄν; VII. 68. 1; VI. 16. 3; IV. 18. 4 σωφρόνων δὲ ἀνδρῶν οἵτινες, etc.; III. 45. 7; V. 16. 1. Similar is the use of the relative with ellipsis to motivate or expand a preceding suggestion. I. 40. 2; I. 68. 3; I. 82. 1; III. 55. 3; III. 39; VI. 61. 1; IV. 26. 4; II. 44. 2; II. 45. 2; IV. 92. 2; VI. 68. 1. Cf. Jebb on O. C. 263.

<sup>2</sup> ἐπιτετηδευκώς . . . ἵνα διαλλάξῃ τοὺς ἄλλους συγγραφείς, Dionysius De Thucyd. 51.

the substantive into a verb; and perverting their use so as to make appellatives of names, and names of appellatives; active verbs of passive, and passive of active; and interchanging singular and plural, and predicating masculines, feminines, and neuters of each other to the utter confounding of the natural sequence of the thought" (De Thucyd. Judic. 24).

Quite apart from the contortions of the style, the sympathetic student experiences a sense of strain in reading Thucydides. The actors in the drama never relax the tension of their intellectual faculties.<sup>1</sup> We are in a world of analysis and logical relations in which nothing, to borrow Professor James' phrase, is given over to the "effortless custody of habit." We are constantly called upon to weigh evidence, balance probabilities, divine motives, and to compare or contrast human characteristics and faculties, national, typical, or individual.<sup>2</sup> We are required to forecast the probabilities of the proverbially uncertain future in the light of the entire record of the past at every crisis of the action, and, whenever the power of God or fortune makes forecast foresworn, as Pindar hath it, we are expected to feel a shock of surprise at the illogical logic of events and the paradoxes of human life.<sup>3</sup> *εὐλογος*, *ἄλογος*, *εἰκός* and their synonyms and paronyms occur on every page. The chief concern of every speaker is to show that his own course of action, whatever the actual event, was logical, plausible,

<sup>1</sup> τὸ . . . ἀντιτετάχθαι ἀλλήλοις τῇ γνώμῃ III. 83. 1.

<sup>2</sup> I. 70; I. 121; I. 141; I. 142; II. 87. 4; II. 89; III. 37. 1; III. 56. 5; IV. 10. 5; V. 9. 1; V. 14; V. 16; IV. 40; V. 75; V. 105. 3, 4; VI. 11; VI. 17. 1; VI. 18; VI. 68. 3; VI. 69. 3; VI. 72. 3; VI. 77; VI. 80. 3; VII. 5. 4; V. 14. 2, 4; VII. 48. 4; VII. 34. 7; VII. 61-64; VII. 66-68; VII. 71; VIII. 96. Observe the frequency of *ἀντίπαλος*, *ισόρροπος*, *ἀγχώματος*, *ἀντιτιθέναι*, and other compounds of *ἀντί*, as *ἀντεπιβουλεύσαι*, *ἀντιμελλῆσαι*, and the weighing in the argumentative balance of *ἐμπειρία* and *μελέτη* and *φύσει* and *διδασχῇ* and *εὐψυχία* and *ξύνεσις* and *ἀμαθία*. Ionian and Dorian, land power and naval power, etc., etc.

<sup>3</sup> III. 32. 3; IV. 12. 3; II. 65. 12, 13; IV. 39. 3; IV. 40; VII. 12. 2; VII. 28; VII. 34. 7; VII. 55; VII. 62. 4 *πεισομαχεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν νεῶν*; VIII. 25. 5; VIII. 66. 5. Observe also the frequency of *παρὰ δύναμιν*, *παρὰ γνώμην*, *παρὰ δόξαν*, *παρὰ λόγον*, *πολὺς ὁ παράλογος*, *τῷ ἀδοκῆτῳ*, *ἐς τούναντιον*—*περίεστη* I. 120. 5; *ἐς τοῦτο περίεστη ἡ τύχη* IV. 12. 3, etc.

consistent,<sup>1</sup> and when formal disputation ceases, men argue still in the forum of their own minds, and abstractions are personified to continue the debate.<sup>2</sup>

Thucydides himself, in one of the few passages where he betrays a personal interest, goes out of his way to defend at length the *σωφροσύνη*, that is, the good judgment of the Chians in their treacherous revolt from Athens (VIII. 25). *εἰ δέ τι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρωπείοις τοῦ βίου παραλόγοις ἐσφάλησαν* — why their error, shared by the best minds of the time, was quite excusable. Similar is the feeling underlying his eager defence of the justice of Pericles' forecasts of the future.<sup>3</sup>

In conclusion, it would be an interesting if elusive inquiry, to ask how much of this disputatious, analytic, antithetic, cynical manner was due to the fashion of the new rhetorical dialectic, how much to the disintegration of popular morality under the stress of war, how much is the real expression of the mind and heart of Thucydides. The rhetoric of the time was responsible for much. It is impossible to accept Jevon's critical dictum that Thucydides is no stylist, but rather a perpetual demonstration that there is a higher art than that of concealing art — the art of dispensing with it. And there are many exceptions to be taken to Jebb's statement that the student of Thucydides always has the consolation of knowing that he is not engaged in the hopeless or thankless task of unravelling a mere rhetorical tangle. Thucydides is doubtless rich in ideas — *ὥσπερ ἐκ πηγῆς*

<sup>1</sup> I. 32. 3; IV. 87. 3; V. 104; V. 105. 4; VI. 79. 2; VI. 85 *ἀνδρὶ δὲ τυράννῳ ἡ πόλει ἀρχὴν ἐχούσῃ οὐδὲν ἀλογον ὁ τι ζυμφέρειν*.

<sup>2</sup> VIII. 24 *καὶ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἡσθάνοντο οὐδ' αὐτοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας . . . ὥς οὐ πάνυ πόνηρα σφῶν βεβαίως τὰ πράγματα εἰη*; II. 87. 3 *οὐδὲ δίκαιον τῆς γνώμης τὸ μὴ κατὰ κράτος νικηθέν, ἔχον δὲ τινα ἐν αὐτῷ ἀντιλογίαν*. Cf. the Euripidean subtlety of *καὶ γὰρ ὁ μὴ ῥηθεὶς λόγος τοῖς ᾧδ' ἔχουσιν αἰτίαν ἂν παράσχοι ὥς εἰ ἐλέχθη σωτήριος ἂν ᾦν* III. 53. Cf. Eurip. Suppl. 298 *οὔτοι σιωπῶς εἶτα μέμφομαι ποτε | τῇν νῦν σιωπῇν ὥς ἐσιγήθη κακῶς*. Cf. I. 140 *μήδ' ἐν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰτίαν ὑπολίπησθε*, etc. Cf. also the curious subtlety of VII. 66. 3; I. 36. 1; VI. 78. 1-3; VI. 79; V. 86; IV. 92. 2; VII. 34. 7; IV. 55. 3; II. 64. 6; V. 90; II. 8. 4, repeated IV. 14. 2.

<sup>3</sup> II. 65.

πλουσίας ἀπειρόν τι χρήμα νοημάτων καὶ ἐνθυμημάτων, says Dionysius. But the expression is almost always elaborately tortured for effect. Often what we take for a new substantive thought is merely an ingenious variation on a commonplace theme. Often periphrases that are apparently wrapped around a kernel of profound suggestion are found empty when unfolded. Irrelevant distinctions of synonyms abound. In place of real antithesis we are frequently put off with the verbal form of an antithesis,<sup>1</sup> and speech after speech is wound up with an aphorism that under scrutiny turns out to be a pompous truism.<sup>2</sup> More matter with less art, we cry. And these faults, to judge by almost the only strictly contemporaneous writer of prose, — Antiphon, — were characteristics of the formal rhetoric of the time slightly exaggerated by Thucydides. Dionysius cites Antiphon, together with Lysias and Andocides, to prove that Thucydides' style was not that of his contemporaries. But this is very undiscriminating criticism. Antiphon can narrate the murder of Herodes as simply and lucidly as Thucydides the attack on Plataea. But when he puts on the buskins of formal argumentation, we can hardly distinguish his gait from that of the historian.<sup>3</sup>

Still more difficult is it to apportion the responsibility for the cynicism of the history between the historian and his time. The theme was certainly disheartening enough. A writer would need great naïveté or the support of a transcendental faith in order to retain any moral illusions while chronicling the affairs of Melos, Plataea, and Corcyra, the butcheries of Mycalessus, Mitylene, Scione (IV. 122, V. 32), the treacherous murder of the Spartan Helots (IV. 80), the trick of the Sicilians at Egesta, the impudent

<sup>1</sup> A notable instance in II. 42 τῶνδε δὲ οὔτε πλούτῳ τις τὴν ἔτι ἀπόλαυσιν προτιμήσας ἐμαλακίσθη οὔτε πενίας ἐλπιδι, ὡς κὰν ἔτι διαφυγῶν αὐτὴν πλουτήσκειν.

<sup>2</sup> I. 34. 3 ὁ γὰρ ἐλαχίστας τὰς μεταμελείας ἐκ τοῦ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς ἐναντίοις λαμβάνων ἀσφαλέστατος ἂν διατελοίη; III. 48. 2 ὅστις γὰρ εὖ βουλευέται πρὸς τοὺς ἐναντίους κρείσσων ἐστὶν ἢ μετ' ἔργων ἰσχύος ἀνοία ἐπίων; V. 9. 4; III. 30. 4; V. 111. 4; II. 11. 9; II. 64. 6; VI. 14 καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀρξαι τοῦτ' εἶναι ὃς ἂν τὴν πατρίδα ὠφελήσῃ ὡς πλείστα ἢ ἐκὼν εἶναι μηδὲν βλάβῃ.

<sup>3</sup> Tetral. I. Γ 3; Herod. 7, 73, 92-93, 84.

crafteries of Alcibiades, the clever stratagem of Phrynichus (VIII. 50), the negotiations between the Peace of Nicias and the battle of Mantinea, the machinations of the revolutionary party of 411, and the various minor treasons and atrocities that darken these pages.<sup>1</sup> And there is little evidence of any such triumphant faith in Thucydides. Classen, it is true, brackets him with Aristophanes as a high-minded castigator of the immorality of his age, and extracts a wealth of moral and religious truth from his unimpassioned narrative. But the more critical Jebb is obliged to put a great strain on the text in order to discover one or two edifying aphorisms, such as that justice is the common good and is identical with true self-interest;<sup>2</sup> or that we ought to receive the inscrutable dispensations of heaven with resignation;<sup>3</sup> and is at last forced to fall back on the oft-quoted sentence about simple-mindedness and true nobility, and the two-edged argument of the "naked repulsiveness in which he exhibits the right of might." We cannot, it is true, attribute to Thucydides himself all the cynicism of the Thebans at Plataea, of the partisans at Corcyra, of the Athenians at Melos, or the shameless euphemisms of the *καλοὶ κάγαθοι* of the oligarchical party at Athens,<sup>4</sup> but there is

<sup>1</sup> Cf. e.g. II. 67. 4; II. 70. 1; II. 79. 2; III. 32. 1; III. 113. 6; IV. 23; IV. 76. 2; VI. 61; VI. 74; VII. 48. 2; VIII. 93. 3; VIII. 56. 2; VIII. 89. 3; V. 76; I. 90; I. 107. 4.

<sup>2</sup> He cites V. 90 and I. 41, which should be I. 42 *τό τε γὰρ συμφέρον ἐν ᾧ ἀν τις ἐλάχιστα ἀμαρτάνῃ μάλιστα ἔπεται*, which will certainly bear no more moral meaning than is given it by Crawley's "the straightest path is generally the best." The *κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν* of V. 90 is not abstract justice, but that reasonable forbearance towards the vanquished and the weak of which the Melians warn the Athenians that they too may one day stand in need.

<sup>3</sup> II. 64. 2, on which Boehme, Einleitung XVIII., naïvely remarks: "Es geht ein Zug tiefen religiösen Ernstes eben so entscheiden durch das Werk, als dasselbe durchweg von echt sittlichem Geiste erfüllt ist." Cf. supra, p. 12. Similarly Classen, ed. 1879, Einleitung LVIII.

<sup>4</sup> VIII. 47 *οὐ πονηρίᾳ οὐδὲ δημοκρατίᾳ*; VIII. 53 *εἰ μὴ πολιτεύσομεν σωφρονέστερον*; VIII. 65 *καὶ ἄλλους τινὰς ἀνεπιτηδείους . . . κρίψα ἀνήλωσαν*; VIII. 66 *εὐθύς ἐκ τρόπου τινὸς ἐπιτηδείου τεθνήκει*; VIII. 68 *ὁ μέντοι ἅπαν τὸ πρᾶγμα ξυνθεῖς . . . Ἀντιφῶν ἦν ἀνὴρ . . . τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν ἀρετῇ τε οὐδενὸς δεύτερος*; VIII. 69 *Ἕλληνες νεανίσκοι οἱς ἐχρῶντο εἰ τί που δέοι χειρουργεῖν*; VIII. 70 *οἱ ἐδόκουν ἐπιτήδευοι εἶναι ὑπεξαίρεθῆναι*.

little evidence in his writings of any generous indignation at them. The declaration that Nicias least deserved to suffer what he did, on account of his habitual practice of all conventional virtue, conveys quite as much irony or sense of dramatic contrast as moral affirmation.<sup>1</sup> We learn elsewhere that Nicias was excessively devoted to religiosity, and that sort of thing (VII. 50. 4), and there is an intense Sophoclean irony in the statement that he had resolved to leave behind him, if possible, the name of a man who had never brought disaster upon the state, as well as in the repeated malicious allusions to his good fortune.<sup>2</sup> *Vive pius moriere pius* seems to be the moral. Thucydides merely chronicles, he does not himself indorse, the pious attribution by the Spartans of their failure in the first period of the war to their violation of their treaty obligations.<sup>3</sup>

The impression made by the whole history is that the writer's mind was subdued by what it worked in. Only once or twice does he let fall a word of pity, as *μείζω ἢ κατὰ δάκρυα*, of the sufferings of the Athenians at Syracuse (VII. 75), or *οὐδενὸς . . . ἥσσον ὀλοφύρασθαι ἀξίῳ* of the butchery at Mycalessus (VII. 30). Elsewhere the repressed feeling finds vent in such loaded and contorted phraseology as *κατὰ πάντα γὰρ πάντως νικηθέντες καὶ οὐδὲν ὀλίγον ἐς οὐδὲν κακοπαθήσαντες πανωλεθρία δὴ τὸ λεγόμενον καὶ πεζὸς καὶ νῆες καὶ οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐκ ἀπώλετο* (VII. 87); or *πᾶσά τε ἰδέα κατέστη θανάτου καὶ . . . οὐδὲν ὅ τι οὐ ξυνέβη καὶ ἔτι περαιτέρω* (3. 81). Sometimes, also, feeling is displayed by the brief pregnant suggestion of a startling dramatic contrast: e.g. *τὰ μὲν κατὰ Πανσανίαν τὸν Λακεδαιμόνιον καὶ*

<sup>1</sup> VII. 86 *διὰ τὴν πᾶσαν ἐς ἀρετὴν νενομισμένην ἐπιτήδευσιν*. That *πᾶσαν* and *νενομισμένην* go with *ἐπιτήδευσιν* does not affect the sense, which is not "der Gewissenhaftigkeit gemäss eingerichtet" (Boehme), nor "das durch Gesetz und Herkommen geregelte Streben nach dem Edeln" (Classen), nor quite "he lived in the practice of every virtue" (Jowett), nor precisely "his exact attention to every religious duty" (Crawley).

<sup>2</sup> V. 16. VI. 17 *καὶ ὁ Νίκιας εὐτυχὴς δοκεῖ εἶναι*. Cf. VI. 23. 3 *ὅτι ἐλάχιστα τῇ τύχῃ παραδοὺς ἐμμαντὸν βούλομαι ἐκπλεῖν*.

<sup>3</sup> VII. 18. On Thucydides' attitude towards the religious opinions of his time, see two good pages in Jevons' *History of Greek Literature*, 336, 337.

Θεμιστοκλέα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον λαμπροτάτους γενομένους τῶν καθ' ἑαυτοὺς Ἑλλήνων οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν (I. 138), and τὰ μὲν κατὰ τὴν μεγάλην στρατείαν Ἀθηναίων καὶ τῶν ξυμμάχων ἐς Αἴγυπτον οὕτως ἐτελεύτησεν (I. 110), or, best of all, the allusion in the midst of the horrors of the break up of the camp before Syracuse to the magnificent description of the splendors of the embarkation at Athens. . . . ἀπὸ οἷας λαμπρότητος καὶ αὐχήματος τοῦ πρώτου ἐς οἷαν τελευτὴν καὶ ταπεινότητα ἀφῆκτο.<sup>1</sup> Even when his own feelings are most strongly enlisted, the expression of them is checked and embarrassed by his deep-seated fear of the spirit of *blague*, as tyrannous in ancient Athens as in modern Paris. His contempt of sentimental expansion (μακρηγορεῖν ἐν εἰδόσι, etc.) returns upon himself and destroys the sources of genuine feeling. μὴ παλαιὰς ἀρετὰς εἴ τις ἄρα καὶ ἐγένετο ἀκούοντες ἐπικλασθήτε the Thebans say with a cold sneer to the Spartans sitting in judgment on the men of Plataea. We make no fine speeches about our merits as the overthrowers of barbarians, the Athenian envoys protest at Camarina. The habit of utterances like these makes it impossible for Thucydides to relieve his feelings by free expansion of Nicias' last words in the supreme crisis of Athens. The smile of an imagined cynical reader<sup>2</sup> stays his pen, and in place of what might have been the most moving speech in the history, we have the cold, indirect report: ἄλλα τε λέγων ὅσα ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ ἤδη τοῦ καιροῦ ὄντες ἄνθρωποι οὐ πρὸς τὸ δοκεῖν τι ἀρχαιολογεῖν<sup>3</sup> φυλαξάμενοι εἵποιεν ἂν: "With other remarks that at such a crisis men would not spare from fear of seeming to fall into old-style sentimental commonplace" — the most pathetic words in the entire eight books when interpreted in the light of the spiritual history of the time and the writer.

<sup>1</sup> VII. 75; cf. VI. 32. Cf. also III. 113.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. I. 73. 2 τὰ δὲ Μηδικὰ . . . εἰ καὶ δι' ὅχλου μᾶλλον ἔσται αἰεὶ προβαλλομένοις.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Isocrates' use of ἀρχαῖα, Orat. III. 26, and IV. 30.